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1.  Introduction
In general, both the development of the parameters of law dealing with international 
crimes and the application of this law by both international and national institutions have 
known historical ebbs and flows. A major impetus was received after the Second World 
War until about 1950 after which very little happened until the mid-nineties even though 
conflicts in which international crimes occurred continued unabated during the second 
half of the twentieth century.
Most of the law of war crimes and crimes against humanity was developed in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War and consisted of the instruments set-
ting up the two international military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the legislative 
authority enabling domestic courts to deal with war criminals in Europe and Asia, the 
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caselaw developed by these tribunals and courts,1 the adoption of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention and the passing of the Geneva Conventions which regulated the conduct of 
war, including its violations.2 Virtually all the important principles for this area of law can 
be traced back to this time period with some other important cases, such as the Menten 
case in the Netherlands,3 the Barbie, Papon and Touvier cases in France4 and the Eichman 
trial in Israel5 adding refinements to those principles. When international criminal law 
1 The most important cases have been described in a variety of law reports; the proceedings 
and the verbatim judgments of the Military Tribunals in Nuremberg have been reported 
very extensively in the 15 volumes of the Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg 
Military Tribunals, the so-called Green Series (see http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/
php/docs_swi.php?DI=1&text=nur_13tr and http://www.phdn.org/archives/www.
mazal.org/NMT-HOME.htm) (Unless specified, all links have been checked 15/12/14) 
There has also been the Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals for all proceedings including the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, which is a 15 volume compilation of summaries and case comments of 
important decisions selected and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission (see 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/law-reports-trials-war-criminals.html and http://web.
archive.org/web/20131212211059/http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/war_criminals.htm). 
The judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal is reported in Volume 22 of 
the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
November 1945 - 1 October 1946 which was published at Nuremberg in 1949 and is also known 
as the Blue Series (see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp#proc). There is also 
some reporting of war crimes trials in Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases, 
which changed its name in 1950 to International Law Reports. 
2 There are four Geneva Conventions: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva I); Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea (Geneva II); Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva 
III); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva 
IV).  The war crimes provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been supplemented by 
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, articles 11 and 85. For a discussion of the post WWII caselaw 
see Rikhof, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and Immigration Law, 19(2) Immigration 
Law Reporter (1993) p. 18, at 30-46.
3 75 International Law Reports (1987), p. 331ff.
4 See 78 International Law Reports (1988), p. 123 for the Barbie case; http://www.trial-ch.org/en/
trial-watch/profile/db/facts/maurice_papon_188.html for the Papon case and http://www.trial-
ch.org/en/trial-watch/profile/db/facts/paul_touvier_124.html for the Touvier case.  
5 36 International Law Reports  p. 1. 
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was examined by Canadian,6 Australian7 and British criminal courts8 in the eighties and 
nineties, a direct link was made between the post-WWII law and the cases before them. 
This was not only done because the persons who had been investigated by the Canadian, 
British and Australian governments had committed their acts during the Second World 
War but also because there was no new law to speak of in the interim. However, there has 
been an explosion of new developments internationally in the area of war crimes in the 
last 20 years. 
2.  Trials of international crimes 
2. 1.  International institutions
The first international institutions since the post-WWII period were the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)9 and Rwanda (ICTR),10 which were 
established in 1994 and 1995 respectively. These tribunals have their own Trial Chambers 
and a shared Appeals Chamber. The decisions of the Chambers of the two tribunals have 
greatly contributed to the development of the international law of war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity. As of December 18, 2014, the ICTY has indicted 161 per-
sons, the cases of 136 of those have been completed, resulting in the conviction and sen-
tencing of 75 persons in 51 separate trial processes,11 as well as 20 acquittals, while it also 
has transferred eight cases involving 13 persons to national jurisdictions, all to Bosnia 
6 The Finta case; for the Supreme Court of Canada decision see [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
7 There have been three criminal prosecutions in Australia, namely the cases of Berezovsky, 
Wagner and Polyukhovich; the decision of the High Court of Australia in the last case can be 
found in 101 Australian Law Reports (1991) p. 545, 172 Commonwealth Law Reports p. 501 and 
91 International Law Reports (1993) p. 1. 
8 There has been one prosecution in the United Kingdom, namely the Sawoniuk trial which has 
been the only successful prosecution of a WWII perpetrator based on universal jurisdiction; 
for an assessment, see 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (1999), Part III, “National 
Decisions.”
9 The official name is “The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991” and was established on May 25, 1993 as the result of Security Council 
Resolution 837 (UNDOC S/RES/827 (1993).
10 The official name of the tribunal is “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other 
such violations in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 
1994” and was established by Security Council Resolution  UNDOC S/RES/955 on November 8, 
1994. 
11 See http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm, under “About the ICTY”, then “Key Figures of 
the Cases” 
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and Herzegovina except two to Croatia and one to Serbia.12 The ICTR has indicted 93 
persons of whom 76 have been arrested and 67 convicted in 44 judgments (plus another 
12 have been acquitted) while deciding to transfer 11 persons for trial in national juris-
dictions, one to the Netherlands, two to France and eight to Rwanda.13
Apart from the activities of the two ad hoc tribunals,14 there has been a lot of work 
done under the auspices of the United Nations to establish a permanent internation-
al criminal court. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was adopted 
on July 17, 199815 and amended on June 11, 2010,16 contains definitions of aggression, 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, which must be considered at those 
respective times the most contemporary formulation of international law pertaining to 
these crimes. The court started operating on July 1, 2002 and has indicted 31 persons in 
eight situations (nobody has been indicted in the most recent situation, Mali, yet) namely 
five leaders of the Lord Resistance Army for the Ugandan situation (two of which have 
died since the approval of the indictment); eight Sudanese persons in respect to the Dar-
fur situation (including the head of state of Sudan); six for the situation in Kenya (the 
indictments of four have been confirmed but two was withdrawn by the prosecutor); 
three (including the head of state although the indictment has been withdrawn due to 
his death) for the situation in Libya; three (including the previous head of state and his 
wife) for the situation in Ivory Coast, two of whom are in custody; one for the situation 
involving the Central African Republic who is in custody; and six from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) regarding war crimes committed in the Ituri and Kivu 
regions of that country; five of the six indictees for the last situation were in custody at 
12 Namely: Jankovic, decided by both the Trial and Appeal Chamber;  Stankovic, both TC and 
AC; Todovic/Rasevic,  both TC and AC; Mejakic/Gruban/Knezevic/Dusan Fustar, TC and AC; 
Ademi/Norac, TC; Ljubicic, TC and AC; Kovacevic, TC and AC, and Trbic, TC, all to BiH except 
two to Croatia [Ademi/Norac] and one to Serbia [Kovacevic]). The ICTY has also transferred 
files to other jurisdictions of persons who were investigated but not indicted by the OTP (see 
http://www.icty.org/sid/103) 
13 Bagaragaza, TC and AC to the Netherlands (however, this transfer has been cancelled); 
Bucyibaruta, TC and Munyeshyaka, TC, to France; the ICTR has also transferred two persons to 
Rwanda, namely Uwinkindi and Munyagishari, as well as ordering the transfer of the cases of five 
other persons who are still at large, namely Kayishema, Sikubwabo,  Ntaganzwa, Ryandikayo, 
Ndimbati and Munyarugarama and 55 files (as of August 1, 2014) to Rwanda, which had been 
investigated but not indicted by the ICTR for further investigation and possible future action by 
Rwanda (see http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1138) 
14 Their work has been taken over in part by the United Nations Mechanism for International 
Criminal Tribunals, see http://www.unmict.org/.   
15 The Statute can be found in 37 International Legal Materials p. 999 and on the United Nations 
website at http://un.org/law/icc. The ICC’s own website is http://www.icc-cpi.int/; 122 countries 
have ratified the Statute.
16 This was the result of the first review conference held in Kampala and contained in Resolution 
RC/Res. 6.
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the ICC (of which one has been released as ordered by the Pre-Trial Chamber, which was 
confirmed by the Appeals Chamber).17 
The first trial (Lubanga) before the ICC was supposed to start on June 23, 2008 but the 
proceedings were stayed on June 13, 2008 due to irregularities in the prosecution case, a 
decision which was upheld by the Appeals Chamber on October 21, 2008. However, on 
November 18, 2008 the stay was lifted and the trial began on January 26, 2009. On July 8, 
2010, the Trial Chamber imposed another stay of proceedings, due to the non-implemen-
tion of disclosure orders by the court, which was overturned by the Appeals Chamber on 
October 8, 2010. Lubanga was convicted on March 14, 2012 and sentenced to 14 years 
imprisonment on July 10, 2012. The conviction and sentence was upheld on December 1, 
2014. The second trial (Katanga and Chui) started on November 24, 2009 and the third 
(Bemba) on November 22, 2010; the Katanga and Chui case was severed with Chui being 
acquitted on December 18, 2012  and Katanga convicted on March 7, 2014 and sentenced 
to 12 years on May 23, 2014. He discontinued his appeal on June 25, 2014.18
The United Nations has also been instrumental in establishing five hybrid tribunals 
for dealing with international crimes,19 namely the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of 
the Dili District Court in East Timor (and its Court of Appeal), the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia, the War Crimes 
Chamber of the state court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the courts in Kosovo. These 
courts have (or had) a mixed membership of local and international judges (see Table 1 
below for more details with respect to these institutions). There have been discussions to 
set up other internationalized tribunals, such as in Liberia, Burundi20, Kenya21 and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo22 but these have not resulted in the establishment of 
any such institutions.
17 Seenhttp://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20
and%20cases.aspx as well as Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Volume I: 
Foundations and General Part (OUP 2013) pp. 35-40.
18 For more details of the work of the court, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/
ICC-ASP-11-21-ENG.pdf. 
19 The United Nations has also established a sixth tribunal based on an agreement with a national 
state with international aspects, namely the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, but this tribunal does 
not have the same jurisdiction as the other tribunals (See article 1 of the Agreement which 
is attached as an Annex to Security Council Resolution 1757 (2007), May 30, 2007); the Trial 
Chamber confirmed the indictment involving four persons on June 28, 2011 while on February 
1, 2012 it allowed the trial of the four accused to proceed in absentia; on October 10, 2013 a fifth 
person was charged while the trial started on January 16, 2014.
20 http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/negotiations-reconciliation-commission-
special-tribunal-resume-burundi. 
21 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8177525.stm. 
22 http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/international-tribunal-congo-%E2%80%93-a-
road-map. 
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Table 1: Internationalized Tribunals with Jurisdiction for International Crimes23
23 For more information regarding these tribunals, see Currie &  Rikhof, International and 
Transnational Criminal Law (Irwin Law 2013) pp. 212-224; Ambos 2013 op. cit., pp. 40-54.
East Timor Kosovo Sierra Leone Cambodia Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Iraq
Official Name Panels with 
Exclusive 
Jurisdiction over 
Serious Offences
None, regular 
courts
Special Court for 
Sierra Leone
Extraordinary 
Chambers of 
the Courts of 
Cambodia
War Crimes 
Chamber of 
the State Court 
of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Iraqi Special 
Tribunal, later 
called the Iraqi 
High Tribunal
Type of Tribunal Established 
by the United 
Nations 
Transitional 
Administration 
for East Timor 
(UNTAET)
Established 
by the United 
Nations Interim 
Administration 
Mission 
in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) 
followed in 2008 
by the European 
Union Rule of 
Law Mission 
(EULEX)
Agreement 
between United 
Nations and the 
Government of 
Sierra Leone
Agreement 
between United 
Nations and the 
Government of 
Cambodia
Joint initiative 
of the ICTY 
and the Office 
of the High 
Representative 
in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
(OHR)
The first iteration 
established by the 
Iraqi Coalition 
Provisional 
Authority, the 
second by the 
Iraqi Transitional 
National 
Assembly
Dates of 
Operation
June 6, 2000-May 
1, 2005
As of June 10, 
1999
 January 16, 2002 
– December 3, 
2013
As of May 7, 
2006
As of March 9, 
2005
As of December 
10, 2003
Temporal
Jurisdiction
Offences 
committed 
between January 
1 to October 25, 
1999
None Offences 
committed since 
November 30, 
1996
Offences 
committed 
between April 17, 
1975 and January 
6, 1979
Offences 
committed 
between 1992 
and 1995
Offences 
committed 
between July 17, 
1968 and May 1, 
2003
International 
Aspects
Majority of 
International 
Judges
Majority of 
International 
Judges (at 
request)
Majority of 
International 
Judges
Minority of 
International 
Judges
Majority of 
International 
Judges (to be 
phased out by 
2012)
No International 
Judges but 
International 
Monitoring
Subject 
Jurisdiction 
(International 
Crimes)
-Genocide
-International 
War Crimes
-Crimes against 
Humanity
-Genocide
-War Crimes
-Non-
International 
War Crimes
-Crimes against 
Humanity
-Genocide
-International 
War Crimes
-Crimes against 
Humanity
-Genocide
-War Crimes
-Crimes against 
Humanity
-Genocide
-War Crimes
-Crimes against 
Humanity
Inspiration for 
International 
Crimes
ICC Statute Not Applicable ICTY/ICTR/
ICC Statutes
ICTY/ICTR 
Statutes
ICTY Statute ICC Statute
Subject 
Jurisdiction 
(Domestic 
Crimes)
-Murder
-Sexual Offences
-Torture
All crimes -Abuse of Girls
-Wanton 
Destruction of 
Property
-Murder
-Torture
-Religious 
Persecution
-Organized crime -Manipulation of 
Judiciary
-Wastage 
of Natural 
Resources
-Aggression
Defender’s office No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of cases 84 83 10 2 100 17
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2.2.  Domestic trials of international crimes24
There have been processes involving international crimes based on territorial or active 
nationality jurisdiction in 32 countries (including the three internationalized domestic 
courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor), namely seven in Europe, 
eleven in Latin America, four in Asia and ten in Africa resulting in over 16,000 convic-
tions since 1995.
In Europe, apart from the national courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, 
both of which were discussed above because of their international aspects, there have 
been a number of other war crimes prosecutions in the former Yugoslavia, namely in 
Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia, as well as in Romania, Hungary and Lithua-
nia, although in the latter three countries charges were laid for crimes committed in the 
fifties and sixties and only one of the four trials has resulted in a conviction so far, namely 
in Hungary.
In Central and South America, ten countries have started criminal investigations and 
prosecutions against persons involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity and geno-
cide carried out under previous regimes, namely in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Haiti and Mexico while Paraguay has used the ex-
tradition approach for similar crimes.25 
In Asia, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Bangladesh have initiated international crime 
trials, the latter pertaining to the time that Bangladesh become independent, namely 
1971, while Israel has effected the extradition of a suspected war criminal to Bosnia.
In Africa, prosecutions have begun in eight countries, namely the Republic of the 
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, 
Guinea and Ivory Coast while South Africa has started an investigation into internation-
24 For more details of the trials referred below, see the website of TRIAL Watch at http://www.trial-
ch.org/en/resources/trial-watch/trial-watch.html. 
25 See http://www.icso.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Cifras_septiembre_2012_ENG.pdf; for a 
detailed discussion of the jurisprudence in this area, see Digest of Latin American Jurisprudence 
on International Crimes, Volumes I and II at http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/digesto_
jurisprudencia_en_pdf_0.pdf; for a general overview, see Ambos 2013, op. cit., pp. 114-117 as 
well as Volume 10, Number 4 of the 2010 edition of the International Criminal Law Review; 
see also ‘Nunca Más’: Connecting Latin American Approaches to Impunity with Positive 
Complementarity Using Technology Driven Resources, By Emilie Hunter, Dorothy Estrada-
Tanck and María Luisa Piqué, FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 16 (2013) at http://www.fichl.org/
fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_Policy_Brief_Series/FICHL_PB16_EN.pdf .
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al crimes and Kenya has established an International Crimes Division within its High 
Court, which has not begun operating yet. 26 27 28
Table 2 below provides more detail of completed trials and convictions in these coun-
tries (as a result of which the ongoing trials in Brazil, Haiti, Guinea, Uganda and Ivory 
Coast are not included while the acquittal of the persons charged in Mexico and the Re-
public of the Congo are not part of the table nor is the one conviction in Hungary).
Table 2: Territorial Jurisdiction Trials
26 All conviction figures are approximate.
27 All sentencing figures are approximate.
28 Between 1991 and 2006, there were an additional 611 convictions for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in Croatian courts. However, the lawfulness of a significant number of these 
convictions has been called into question, and many of these trials were conducted in absentia.
Country of Trials Country where 
crimes occurred
Crime(s) Number of 
convictions26
Range of 
conviction dates 
Range of 
sentences 27 
Serbia Serbia War Crimes / 
Crimes against 
Humanity
56  2005 - 2012 5 – 81 years
Croatia Croatia War Crimes / 
Crimes against 
Humanity
233 28 1991 - 2012 6 months – 20 
years
Montenegro Croatia Torture 6 2010 18 months – 4 
years
Slovenia Slovenia War Crimes 1 2013 five years
Chile Chile Crimes against 
Humanity / 
Torture
30 2006 - 2012 4 years - life
Peru Peru Crimes against 
Humanity
3 2007 - 2009 16 years - life
Colombia Colombia Crimes against 
Humanity
9 2010 - 2012 8 – 40 years
Argentina Argentina Crimes against 
Humanity / 
Torture
400+ 2006 - 2013 8 years - life
Uruguay Uruguay Crimes against 
Humanity
1 2009 25 years
Bolivia Bolivia Genocide 7 2011 3 – 15 years
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  29
29 In addition to the regular court system, Rwanda also established a community based court 
system called gacaca from 2005-2012; around 1.2 million people were processed through this 
system; in 2012, the Rwandan government established a specialized chamber in the High Court 
to hear cases involving international crimes.
Country of Trials Country where 
crimes occurred
Crime(s) Number of 
convictions26
Range of 
conviction dates 
Range of 
sentences 27 
Guatemala Guatemala Crimes against 
Humanity / War 
Crimes / Torture
11 2009-2012 53 – 7710 years
Indonesia Indonesia Crimes against 
Humanity
6 2002 3-10 years
Afghanistan Afghanistan War Crimes 1 2006 death
Bangladesh Bangladesh War Crimes / 
Genocide
13 2013-2014 90 years - death
DRC DRC Crimes against 
Humanity / War 
Crimes
20 2006-2010 5 years - death
Ethiopia Ethiopia Genocide 5,000+ 1996-2008 10  years - death
Rwanda 29 Rwanda Genocide / War 
Crimes / Crimes 
against Humanity
10,000+ 1996-2006 5 years - death
Burundi Burundi Crimes against 
Humanity
4 2008 life - death
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2.3.  Universal jurisdiction trials
In Europe30 12 countries have initiated criminal prosecutions for international crimes31 
committed elsewhere between 1994 and 2014, resulting in 43 indictments (of which al-
most 90% since 2000 alone) with 40 persons convicted (in 32 cases) and three acquittals. 
A number of countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) have also extradited persons 
suspected for such crimes or are in the process of doing so, mostly to Rwanda or coun-
tries of the former Yugoslavia although in some cases also to international institutions.
In North America two countries, the United States32 and Canada, have completed 
four criminal trials for international crimes, three in Canada (with one acquittal) and 
one in the United States; both countries have also extradited persons for involvement in 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Australia has been working on two extradition cases in respect of Croatia.
In Africa, South Africa has started two investigations against nationals of other Afri-
can states, namely Madagascar and Zimbabwe while in Senegal a hybrid regional court 
was established to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity committed in 
Chad.33
30 In addition to these investigative and prosecutorial efforts by individual countries, there have 
also been attempts at co-ordinating these activities by improving exchange of information 
pertaining to investigations and by establishing best practices. Interpol has convened four 
International Expert Meetings on Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity since 
2005; see in general http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Fugitive-investigations/War-crimes 
and  http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2009/PR049,  while 
three years earlier the European Union decided to establish an European network of contact 
points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
which meets on a regular basis, see the Official Journal of the European Communities L167/1 
of 26/6/2002 and L118/2 of 14/5/2003. As well, the ICC has started to convene meetings with 
some of the specialized war crimes units in order to develop an efficient co-operation model 
between national states and the ICC based on the complementarity principle enshrined in article 
17 of its Statute. On the non-governmental side, the International Association of Prosecutors 
(IAP) established in 2009 a Specialist War Crimes Forum (http://www.iap-association.org/FICJ/
Home.aspx) while the International Bar Association had formed a War Crimes Committee a 
year earlier (http://www.ibanet.org/PPID/Constituent/War_Crimes_Committee/Default.aspx). 
31 In most cases the international crimes considered in this section are war crimes and genocide 
although in some instances crimes against humanity were charged as well as torture, as defined 
by the 1984 Torture Convention. 
32 The U.S. has also arrested a number of persons for involvement in atrocities in their homeland 
but these prosecutions are launched under its immigration legislation for immigration fraud, 
resulting in both criminal convictions as well as deportations to the country where the crimes 
were committed.
33 For more information re the court in Senegal, see Currie & Rikhof 2013, op. cit. at note 23, pp. 
224-225.
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For details of the completed criminal trials in the 14 countries mentioned above, see 
table 3. 34 35 36
Table 3: Universal Jurisdiction Trials
34 As the accused was a Dutch national, it is not strictly correct to include this case as part of 
universal jurisdiction but it is relevant as the crimes occurred outside Netherlands.
35 This is the same case as the one mentioned before but with different charges.
36 As some of the offences occurred in the Netherlands it is not strictly correct to include this case 
as part of universal jurisdiction but it is relevant as war crimes, some of which were alleged to 
have occurred outside the Netherlands, were included in the indictment.
Country of trial Country where 
crimes occurred
Conviction and 
date
Crimes 
mentioned in 
judgment
Sentence Appeal
Netherlands DRC Yes; 2004 torture 10 years No
Netherlands Afghanistan (two 
persons)
Yes; 2005 war crimes/ 
torture
9 and 12 years Yes; decision upheld 
Netherlands 34 Netherlands/
Iraq
Yes; 2005 war crimes 15 years Yes; decision upheld; 
again upheld by the 
ECtHR 
Netherlands 34 Netherlands/
Liberia
Yes; 2006 UN sanctions 
violation
8 years Yes; decision 
overruled by appeals 
court but reinstated 
by Supreme Court
Netherlands Afghanistan No; 2007 war crimes /
torture
N/A No
Netherlands Rwanda No; 2007 genocide N/A Yes; acquittal upheld
Netherlands 35 Rwanda Yes, 2009 torture 20 years Yes, sentence 
increased to life 
imprisonment
Netherlands 36 Sri Lanka (five 
persons)
Yes, 2011 terrorism and war 
crimes
2-6 years Yes, both sentence 
and fact that war 
crimes aspect was 
denied
Netherlands Rwanda Yes, 2013 genocide 6 years, 8 
months
No
Belgium Rwanda (four 
persons)
Yes; 2001 war crimes 12-20 years No
Belgium Rwanda (two 
persons)
Yes; 2005 murder 10 and 12 years No
Belgium Rwanda Yes, 2009 war crimes 30 years Yes, decision upheld
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37
37 As the accused was a Canadian national, it is not strictly correct to include this case as part of 
universal jurisdiction but it is relevant as the crimes occurred outside Canada.
Country of trial Country where 
crimes occurred
Conviction and 
date
Crimes 
mentioned in 
judgment
Sentence Appeal
Belgium Rwanda Yes, 2007 murder 20 years Yes; decision upheld
Germany Bosnia Yes, 1997 manslaughter 5 years No
Germany Bosnia Yes, 1997 genocide/ murder life Yes; decision upheld; 
again upheld by the 
ECtHR
Germany Bosnia Yes, 1999 genocide/war 
crimes
9 years Yes; decision upheld 
Germany Bosnia Yes, 1999 genocide/war 
crimes
life Yes; decision upheld 
but only for war 
crimes
Germany Rwanda Yes, 2014 genocide 14 years Under appeal
France Argentina Yes (in absentia), 
1990
torture life No
France Mauritania Yes (in absentia), 
2006
torture 10 years Yes; complaint 
to ECtHR held 
inadmissible
France Tunisia Yes (in absentia), 
2008
torture 8 years Yes, decision upheld 
and sentence 
increased to 12 years
France Rwanda Yes, 2014 genocide/crimes 
against humanity
25 years Not yet
Sweden Bosnia Yes, 2011 war crimes 5 years No
Sweden Kosovo Yes, 2012 crimes against 
humanity
life Yes, decision 
overturned
Sweden Rwanda Yes, 2013 genocide life Yes, decision upheld
Canada 37 Bosnia Yes, 2005 hostage taking 3 years Yes, decision upheld
Canada Rwanda Yes, 2009 genocide, crimes 
against humanity, 
war crimes
life Yes, decision upheld 
and confirmed by the 
Supreme Court
Canada Rwanda No, 2013 genocide, crimes 
against humanity
N/A No
Norway Bosnia Yes, 2008 torture/
rape/forcible 
confinement 
(charges for 
international 
crimes held to be 
unconstitutional)
5 years Yes; all aspects of the 
decision upheld by 
appeals court and 
Supreme Court
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2.4.  Observations regarding international and domestic prosecutions
A number of comments can be made about the efforts in the last two decades to put per-
petrators of international crimes on trial.
The first important observation, which applies to both international and domestic 
practice, is the fact that 19 erstwhile38 and two sitting39 heads of state have been indicted, 
prosecuted or sentenced for international crimes.40 Of the five trials begun at the inter-
38 The case of Radovan Karadzic, who was the war-time president of the Republika Srpska in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early nineties and who was indicted by the ICTY in 1995 and 
arrested on July 21, 2008, is not included in this number nor is the case of Jean-Claude “Baby 
Doc” Duvalier who was investigated for but not charged with crimes against humanity.
39 The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant for arrest for Al Bashir, the president of Sudan on 
March 4, 2009 for war crimes and crimes against humanity, which was extended to genocide 
on July 12, 2010 while an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity was issued for Gaddafi on 
June 27, 2011 in respect to the Libyan situation; the warrant for arrest for Gbagbo was issued on 
November October 23, 2011.
40 While four others have been tried (Pol Pot in Cambodia),  indicted (Bordaberry in Uruguay) 
or convicted (Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt) for regular (but similar in seriousness 
as opposed to a large number of corruption or property charges leveled in other cases) crimes 
by domestic courts; for more background see Olasolo, Criminal Responsibility of Political and 
Military Leaders for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes: with Special Reference 
to the Rome Statute and the Statute and Case Law of the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Hart Publishing 
2008); Olasolo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as Principals 
to International Crimes (Hart Publishing, 2009); and Lutz & Reiger (eds.), Prosecuting Heads of 
State, (CUP 2009), especially the Appendix at pages 295-304.
Country of trial Country where 
crimes occurred
Conviction and 
date
Crimes 
mentioned in 
judgment
Sentence Appeal
Norway Rwanda Yes, 2013 genocide 21 years Under appeal
Spain Argentina Yes, 2005 genocide 640 years Yes; decision upheld
Switzerland Rwanda Yes, 1999 war crimes life Yes, decision upheld 
but sentence reduced 
to 14 years which 
upheld again on 
further appeal
Switzerland Guatemala Yes, 2014 Extrajudicial 
killing
life Yes
Denmark Bosnia Yes, 1994 war crimes 8 years Yes; decision upheld
UK Afghanistan Yes, 2005 torture/hostage 
taking
20 years No
Austria Bosnia No, 1994 genocide/murder N/A No
Finland Rwanda Yes, 2010 genocide life Yes; decision upheld
U.S. Liberia Yes, 2009 torture 97 years Yes, decision upheld
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national level (of the cases of the two heads of state indicted by the ICC, Omar Al Bashir 
from Sudan and Muammar Gadaffi of Libya, the former is in the pre-trial phase and at 
large while the latter has died while another ex-head of State, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory 
Coast, has also been indicted) the ICTR sentenced the prime minister of Rwanda during 
the 1994 genocide, Jean Kambanda, to life imprisonment in 1998.41 President Slobodan 
Milosevic of the former Yugoslavia was indicted by the ICTY in 1999 and 2001 and put 
on trial in 2002, which would have been completed if he had not died while in custo-
dy during the proceedings in 2006. The Sierra Leone Special Court indicted the former 
president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, in 2006 and his trial started in early 2008 ending 
with a conviction in 2012 in The Hague. Another hybrid tribunal, the Special Court of 
Iraq, completed proceedings against Saddam Hussein in 2006 resulting in his execution 
the same year. Khieu Samphan, the former president of Democratic Kampuchea, was in-
vestigated by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), his trial 
started in June 2011, and he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on August 
7, 2014. In addition, there have 13 attempts at the domestic level to take action against 
former heads of state since 1992.42  
Secondly, an encouraging trend is the fact that there have been some proceedings 
against corporate players, albeit some have not been successful in the end. While the 
prosecution of corporate executives is not a new phenomenon as there had already been 
prosecutions of this kind after the Second World War against German corporate officials, 
including by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg,43 the international and 
hybrid tribunals have not ventured into this area so far. On the domestic front there have 
been two convictions in the Netherlands for corporate executives for providing weapons 
to the Charles Taylor regime in Liberia and for selling precursors for chemical weapons 
to the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.
41 ICTR 97-23-S, September 4, 1998, upheld by the Appeals Chamber on October 19, 2000, ICTR 
97-23-A.
42 While international institutions can bring sitting heads of state to justice, national states can 
only do so against former heads of state according to the International Court of Justice in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo versus Belgium case, decided February 14, 2003. For more 
information, see Currie & Rikhof 2013, op.cit., p. 3, footnote 9.
43 Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was indicted but did not stand trial during the IMT 
proceedings due to mental illness. Other trials carried out against industrialists included the 
Krupp (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume X, 69), Flick (Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, Volume IX, 1), I.G. Farben (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume X, 
1), Zyklon B (Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume I, 93) and the Roechling (Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Volume  X, 56-57) trials.
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In the DRC, during the Kilwa trial both Congolese soldiers and three executives of the 
mining company Anvil were charged for war crimes but eventually acquitted in 2007;44 
this same incident is being investigated in Australia.  In addition, two executives of the 
French oil company TotalFinaElf have been indicted in both France and Belgium in 2002 
for involvement in crimes against humanity in Burma; the proceedings in Belgium came 
to an end in 2008. Although it might be difficult for international institutions to hold 
corporations themselves responsible for breaches of international criminal law (it is for 
instance explicitly forbidden in the Rome Statute),45 it is clear that the human actors 
representing such corporations are not immune from the reaches of this area of the law.
Thirdly, there are differences between the number of trials held and their modalities. 
Four categories can be distinguished, namely the truly international institutions (ICC, 
ICTY and ICTR) together with the two tribunals established by an agreement between 
the United Nations and a domestic jurisdiction (the SLSC and ECCC); national tribunals 
with some international aspects (Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq); domestic courts 
exercising territorial jurisdiction; and domestic courts exercising universal jurisdiction. 
In terms of number of cases processed, the first and last categories have generally only be 
able to deal with a small numbers of situations while the second and third groups typical-
ly were able to put on trial much larger numbers of suspects. 
This is not entirely surprising given the fact that the ICC, ICTY, ICTR and univer-
sal jurisdiction courts had to carry out their investigations outside their jurisdiction or 
where their seat was established. This is combined with the fact that these institutions, 
as well as the SLSC and ECCC, because of finite resources and their limited mandate of 
investigating the persons most responsible, can only measure their success in some doz-
ens of cases -with somewhat higher numbers for institutions which have been operating 
for a much longer time and with more resources, such as the ICTY and ICTR. On other 
hand, national courts operating on the basis of territorial jurisdiction (either purely do-
mestic courts or such courts with some international dimensions) were able to bring to 
justice hundreds and sometimes thousands of perpetrators. Of the 46 countries that have 
become involved in the prosecutions of perpetrators of international crimes in the last 
twenty years, the vast majority of convictions occurred in the national courts with terri-
torial jurisdiction. More than 16,000 perpetrators have been brought to justice in 32 such 
countries compared to 180 persons convicted by the five international(ized) institutions 
(138) and the 14 countries relying on universal jurisdiction (42) combined. 
44 The trial has been severely and widely criticized. Two of the more poignant commentaries are 
that of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights of July 4, 2007 and the detailed 
report by the NGO Global Witness of July 17, 2007 (http://www.globalwitness.org/library/
victims-kilwa-massacre-denied-justice-congolese-military-court). 
45 Article 25.1. In the United States this type of liability was denied under the Alien Tort Statute, 
see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, US Court of Appeal, 2nd Circuit, September 17, 2010 with 
lengthy discussion of international law on this point.
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The last observation is related to the above in that the level of responsibility of persons 
convicted in criminal trials varies. The five international institutions, as a result of their 
objective to only investigate those most responsible, have put on trial persons who had 
exercised powerful or high level functions within their governments or organizations 
while on the other side of the spectrum, the universal jurisdictions courts typically pros-
ecuted lower level operators with direct personal involvement.46 Domestic courts exercis-
ing territorial jurisdiction ran the gamut of type of perpetrators, from high officials based 
on extended liability principles, through direct perpetrators, to persons on the ground 
committing crimes in an indirect fashion. It is likely that the prosecutors in universal 
jurisdiction countries had many more suspects given the fact that most criminal suspects 
had gone through refugee determination or immigration processes first47 (while senior 
perpetrators often stayed away from these countries), which are often decided on indirect 
participation, but that because of resources limitations only the most serious of these 
cases were selected for criminal investigations.
The combination of taking action against both the leadership up to and including 
heads of state or leaders of non-governmental militia (as was done by the ICC in the cases 
of the LRA leadership in the Ugandan case and four indictments for the situation in the 
DRC), and down to the purveyors of the means to carry out international crimes, sends 
out the powerful message that the international community understands the complex 
forces involved in carrying out these crimes and it is willing to take action against both 
direct and indirect participants. 
3.  Participation in international crimes
3.1.  Introduction
Both international and domestic institutions have developed theories of liability in order 
to extend the circle of perpetrators beyond those who have been personally involved. 
Since the foundation of international criminal law there have been a number of concepts 
to hold persons liable for the commission of international crimes48 in addition to person-
46 See for instance, Human Rights Watch, The Long Arm of Justice Lessons from Specialized War 
Crimes Units in France, Germany, and the Netherlands (2014) at 13.
47 See Rikhof, The Criminal Refugee, The Treatment of Asylum Seekers with a Criminal Background 
in International and Domestic Law (Republic of Letters 2013) pp. 460-469.
48 For a general overview of the principles in article 25.3 of the ICC Statute, including the notion of 
hierarchy of blameworthiness, see Judgment, Katanga (ICC- ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial Chamber, 
March 7, 2014, §§ 1383-1387.
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ally committing such crimes.49 Table 4 sets out the various forms of extended liability for 
completed offences. 
Table 4: Modes of participation for completed offences
49 Personally committing has been defined as follows: ‘the physical perpetration of a criminal act 
or the culpable omission of an act that was mandated by a rule of criminal law’ while the person 
‘must have acted with the intent to commit the crime, or with an awareness of the substantial 
likelihood that the crime would occur as a consequence of his or her conduct’, see: Judgment, 
Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 188 and Judgement, Kaing Guek Eav 
alias Duch (Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC), Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, §§ 480-481; 
direct participation can also be found in a situation where the conduct of the accused was as much 
an integral part of the crimes as the crimes it enabled, see: Judgment, Gacumbitsi, (ICTR-2001-
64-A), Appeals Chamber, 7 July 2006, § 161; Judgment, Ndindabahizi, (ICTR-01-71-A), Appeals 
Chamber, 16 January 2007, § 123; Judgment, Kalimanzira (ICTR-05-88-A), Appeals Chamber, 
20 October 2010, § 219; Judgment, Kanyarukiga (ICTR-02-78), Trial Chamber, 1 November 
2010, § 622; Judgment, Munyakazi (ICTR-97-36A-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 September 2011, § 
135; Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, § 1606.
Nuremberg
/Tokyo
Control 
Council Law 
No. 10
ICTY/ICTR SLSC ECCC ICC
Planning No No Yes Yes Yes No
Ordering No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inducing No No No No No Yes
Soliciting No No No No No Yes
Instigating Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Co-
perpetration
No No No No No ‘commits 
jointly’
Complicity No No Only genocide No No No
Participate No No No No Only genocide No
Aiding, 
abetting
‘Accomplices’ ‘Accessory or 
abetted’
‘Took a 
consenting part
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Accessory after 
the fact
No ‘Accessory’ ‘Committed’ ‘Committed’ ‘Committed’ No
Joint Criminal 
Enterprise
‘Common plan’ ‘Was connected 
with’
‘Committed’ ‘Committed’ ‘Committed’ ‘Common 
purpose’
Command 
or superior 
responsibility
‘Leaders 
organizers’
‘High position’
Only crimes 
against peace
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Membership No Yes No No No No
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Some of the concepts set out above overlap in meaning; for instance, it has been said 
that the term ‘inducing’ in the ICC Statute is synonymous with ‘incitement’ while the 
terms ‘solicit’ and ‘instigate’ are similar.50 On the other hand, with respect to the ICC Stat-
ute, commentators have indicated that accessory after the fact is not part of this instru-
ment.51 Some concepts, such as inducing, initiation and execution have not been subject 
to judicial interpretation as of yet. 
As domestic courts have for the most part relied on the existing modes of liability in 
their own criminal codes,52 this part of the article will be limited to a discussion of some 
of the forms of extended liability at the international level and then only those theories 
which have been used against persons with high levels of influence. These forms of liabil-
ity are command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise and perpetration, which corre-
spond chronologically with the prevalent types of accountability utilized by international 
50 Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary of the Rome Statute (OUP 2010) pp. 
432-433. Cryer et. al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 3rd Edition 
(CUP 2014) p. 375, are of the view that ‘instigation’ is largely the same as ‘soliciting’ or ‘inducing’; 
see also Decision of the Confirmation of Charges, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11), June 12, 2014, § 
243.
51 Schabas, op. cit., p. 435;  Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility in The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I, eds. Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (OUP 
2002) pp. 806-807; however, see, in the context of common purpose, Judgment, Chui, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (ICC-01/04-02/12), Trial Chamber, 18 December 
2012, §§ 286-287.
52 For an analysis of concepts of extended liability in national legal systems see: Eser, ‘Individual 
Criminal Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (OUP 2002) at 781-783; van 
Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (OUP 2012) pp. 61-89, 89-
91, 95-96, 102-104, 110, 112-119 and 131-133; Ambos 2013, op. cit., pp. 114-117; Currie & 
Rikhof 2013, op. cit., pp. 272-278;  Eldar, Exploring International Criminal Law’s Reluctance 
to Resort to Modalities of Group Responsibility: Five Challenges to International Prosecutions 
and their Impact on Broader Forms of Responsibility, 11 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2013) pp. 331-349; Muñoz-Conde & Olásolo, The Application of the Notion of Indirect 
Perpetration through Organized Structures of Power in Latin America and Spain, 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2011) pp. 113-135; Ambos, The Fujimori Judgment: A President’s 
Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity as Indirect Perpetrator by Virtue of an Organized 
Power Apparatus, 9 Journal of international Criminal Justice (2011) pp. 137-158.
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institutions, namely the post Second World War tribunals, the ICTY/ICTR/SLSC, and 
the ICC respectively.53
3.2.  Command Responsibility
A superior will be subject to individual criminal liability if the following elements exist: a 
superior-subordinate relationship; the superior knew or had reason to know that a crim-
inal act was about to be, was being or had been committed, and failure to take necessary 
and reasonable measures to prevent or punish the conduct in question.54
53 For recent academic commentary regarding other forms of liability, see: Finnin, Elements of 
Accessorial Modes of Liability; Article 25(3)(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) pp. 60-72; Agbor, The Substantial 
Contribution Requirement: The Unfortunate Outcome of an Illogical Construction and Incorrect 
Understanding of Article 6(1) of the Statute of the ICTR, 12 International Criminal Law Review 
(2012) pp. 155-191; Agbor, The Problematic Jurisprudence on Instigation under the Statute of the 
ICTR: The Consistencies, Inconsistencies and Misgivings of the Trial and Appeal Chambers of 
the ICTR, 13 International Criminal Law Review, (2013) pp. 429-472; Stewart, The End of ‘Modes 
of Liability’ for International Crimes, 25 Leiden Journal of International Law (2012) pp. 165-219; 
Goy, Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court A Comparison 
with the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 12 International Criminal Law Review (2012) pp. 1-70; Currie & 
Rikhof 2013, op. cit., pp. 645-652; Ambos and Njikam, Charles Taylor’s Criminal Responsibility, 
11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) pp. 789-812; DeFalco, Contextualizing Actus 
Reus under Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute: Thresholds of Contribution, 11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2013) pp. 715-735; Vest, Problems of Participation — Unitarian, 
Differentiated Approach, or Something Else?, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 
pp. 295-309, Stuckenberg, Problems of ‘Subjective Imputation’ in Domestic and International 
Criminal Law, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) at 311-323.
54  For an overview of the jurisprudence after the Second World War, see: Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals, Volume XV at 65-76, Ambos 2013, op. cit., pp. 108-110. For contemporary 
decisions, see: Judgment, Orić (IT-03-68-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 July 2008, § 18; Judgment, 
Hategekimana (ICTR-00-55B-T), Trial Chamber, 6 December 2010, § 653; Judgment, Gotovina 
et al. (IT-06-90-T), Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011, § 1962; Judgment, Setako (ICTR-04-81-A), 28 
September 2011, § 269; Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 
2012, § 1493; Judgment, Nizeyimana (ICTR-2000-55C), Trial Chamber, 19 June 2012, § 1475; 
Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, § 490; Judgment, Gotovina 
and Markač (IT-06-90-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2012, § 128; Judgment, Stanišić and 
Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, §§ 109-110; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-
04-74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, § 237. At the ICC, see the more detailed description in 
article 28 of its Statute; its interpretation in Decision of  the Confirmation of Charges, Bemba 
(ICC-01/05-01/08),Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009, §§ 408-448 (following closely the ICTY/
ICTR jurisprudence), as well as Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Ntaganda (ICC-
01/04-02/06, June 9, 2014, § 164. For recent academic commentary, see: Sander, Unravelling the 
Confusion Concerning Successor Superior Responsibility in the ICTY Jurisprudence, 23 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2010), pp. 105–135; van Sliedregt 2012, op. cit. at note 53 above, pp. 
187-202; Ambos 2013, op. cit., pp. 197-232; Robinson, The Puzzle of Command Responsibility, 
Culpability and Causation: A Problem, the Arguments that Obscure It, and a Liberal Analysis, 
13 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2012) pp. 1-58.
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A superior-subordinate relationship exists where a superior has effective control over 
a sub-ordinate, which means that the superior has the material ability to prevent or pun-
ish the sub-ordinate’s criminal conduct.55 Superior responsibility can arise by virtue of the 
superior’s de jure or de facto power over the relevant subordinate.56 The possession of de 
jure power may not suffice for the finding of superior responsibility if it does not mani-
fest itself in effective control57 or if it only amount to influence.58 A superior cannot incur 
responsibility for crimes committed by a subordinate before he assumed his position as 
superior.59 The superior-subordinate relationship need not be of a permanent nature, but 
55 Judgment, Orić (IT-03-68-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 July 2008, § 20; Judgment, Gotovina et al. 
(IT-06-90-T), Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011, § 1963; Judgment, Ndindiliyimana et al. (ICTR-
00-56-T), Trial Chamber, 17 May 2011, § 1917; Judgment, Nyiramasuhuko et al. (ICTR-98-
42-T), Trial Chamber, 24 June 2011, § 5647; Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 
September 2011, §§ 140 and 147-148; Judgment, Bagosora and Sengiyumva (ICTR-98-41-A), 
Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2011, § 642; Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial 
Chamber, 2 February 2012, §§ 1495-1496; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial 
Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 111;  Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, 
§§ 241 and 244; Judgment, Ndindiliyimana et al. (ICTR-00-56-A), Appeals Chamber, § 378. 
In the Rwandan context it was held that a priest could have effective control, see Judgment, 
Nsengimana (ICTR-01-69-T), Trial Chamber, 17 November 2009, §§ 819-828.
56 Judgment, Mucić et al. (Čelebići Camp’) (IT-96-21), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, §§ 195-
197; Judgment, Ndahimana (ICTR-01-68), Trial Chamber, 30 December 2011, § 726; Judgment, 
Nizeyimana (ICTR-2000-55C), Trial Chamber, 19 June 2012, § 1476; Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-
03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, § 493; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-74), Trial Chamber, 
29 May 2013, § 242.
57 Judgment, Halilović (IT-01-48-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 October 2007, § 204; Judgment, 
Hategekimana (ICTR-00-55B-T), Trial Chamber, 6 December 2010, § 654; Judgment 
Nyiramasuhuko et al. (ICTR-98-42-T), Trial Chamber, 24 June 2011, § 5650-5651; Judgment, 
Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011, §§ 142-144; Judgment, Casimir 
Bizimungu  et al. ( ICTR-99-50-T), Trial Chamber, 30 September 2011, § 1873; Judgment, 
Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, §§ 112-113. 
58 Judgment, Casimir Bizimungu  et al. (ICTR-99-50-T), Trial Chamber, 30 September 2011, §§ 
1891-1893; Judgment, Nizeyimana (ICTR-2000-55C), Trial Chamber, 19 June 2012, § 1476; 
Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, § 493.
59 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command 
Responsibility, Hadžihasanović et al. (IT-01-47-AR72), Appeals Chamber, 16 July 2003, §§ 
37-56; Judgment, Halilović (IT-01-48-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 October 2007, § 67; Judgment 
Ndindiliyimana et al. (ICTR-00-56-T), Trial Chamber, 17 May 2011, § 1960; Judgment 
Nyiramasuhuko et al. (ICTR-98-42-T), Trial Chamber, 24 June 2011, § 5646; Judgment, 
Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, § 1492; Judgment, Stanišić 
and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 114. For the opposite view, see: 
Judgment, Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (‘RUF’) (SCSL-04-15-T), Trial Chamber, 2 March 2009, §§ 
294-306, which was overruled on appeal in Judgment, Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (‘RUF’), SCSL-04-
14-A, Appeals Chamber, 26 October 2009, § 874.
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instead could arise on an ad hoc or temporary basis.60 A superior may however incur su-
perior responsibility no matter how far down the chain of authority the subordinate may 
be and even if the subordinate has participated in the crimes through intermediaries.61 
A superior does not necessarily need to know the exact identity of the subordinates who 
perpetrated the crimes in order to incur liability.62
With respect to the second requirement, this element is fulfilled if a superior knew 
or had reason to know that a subordinate’s criminal act had been carried out, was taking 
place or was about the happen.63 A superior had reason to know only if information was 
available to him, which would have put him on notice of offences committed by sub-
ordinates.64 The ‘reason to know standard’ is met if the superior possessed information 
sufficiently alarming to justify further inquiry.65
60 Judgment Nyiramasuhuko et al. (ICTR-98-42-T), Trial Chamber, 24 June 2011, § 5648; Judgment, 
Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011, § 138; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin 
(IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 114. 
61 Judgment, Orić (IT-03-68-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 July 2008, § 20; Judgment Nyiramasuhuko 
et al. (ICTR-98-42-T), Trial Chamber, 24 June 2011, § 5649; Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-T), 
Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011, § 145; Judgment, Casimir Bizimungu  et al. ( ICTR-99-
50-T), Trial Chamber, 30 September 2011, §§ 1874-1875; Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-
44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, § 1497; Judgment, Nizeyimana (ICTR-2000-55C), Trial 
Chamber, 19 June 2012, § 1477; Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, 
§ 494; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 114; 
see also Sliedregt 2012, op. cit., pp. 189-191 and 194. 
62 Judgment, Bizimungu (ICTR-00-56B-A), Appeals Chamber, June 30, 2014, § 79.
63 Judgment, Kordić and Čerkez  (IT-95-14/2-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004, § 839; 
Judgment, Gotovina et al. (IT-06-90-T), Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011, § 1964; Judgment 
Ndindiliyimana et al. (ICTR-00-56-T), Trial Chamber, 17 May 2011, §§ 1197-1198 and 1919-
120; Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011, § 150; Judgment, 
Bagosora and Sengiyumva (ICTR-98-41-A), Appeals Chamber, 14 December 2011, § 642; 
Judgment, Ndahimana (ICTR-01-68), Trial Chamber, 30 December 2011, §§ 727-728; 
Judgment, Ntabakuze (ICTR-98-41A-A), Appeals Chamber, 8 May, 2012, § 248; Judgment, Taylor 
(SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, §§ 497-498; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin 
(IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 115.
64 Judgment, Krnojelac (IT-97-25-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003, § 156; Judgment, 
Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011, §§ 152-153; Judgment, Karemera et 
al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, §§ 1498-1499; Judgment, Stanišić and 
Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 115; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-
74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, §§ 247-249; Judgment, Ndindiliyimana et al. (ICTR-00-56-A), 
Appeals Chamber, §§ 396-397.
65 Judgment, Strugar (IT- IT-01-42A), Appeals Chamber, 17 July 2008, § 298; Judgment, Popović et 
al. (IT-05-88-T), Trial Chamber, 10 June 2010, § 1041; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1), Trial 
Chamber, 23 February 2011, § 1886; Judgment, Hategekimana (ICTR-00-55B-T), Trial Chamber, 
6 December 2010, § 655-656; Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 6 September 2011, 
§ 151; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 115; 
Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, § 250.
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With respect to the third requirement, necessary measures means appropriate action, 
which show that the superior genuinely tried to prevent before the commission of acts 
by sub-ordinates or punish after such crimes66 while reasonable measures are those rea-
sonably falling within the material powers of the superior.67 A superior is not expected 
to perform the impossible but must use every means within his ability.68 Such measures 
may include carrying out an investigation, transmitting information in a superior’s pos-
session to the proper administrative or prosecutorial authorities, issuing special orders 
aimed at bringing unlawful practices of subordinates in compliance with the rules of war, 
protesting against or criticizing criminal action, reporting the matter to the competent 
authorities or insisting before a superior authority that immediate action be taken.69
66  See: Judgment, Ndahimana (ICTR-01-68-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 December 2013, § 79; 
Decision of the Confirmation of Charges, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11), June 12, 2014, § 264; 
Judgment, Bizimungu (ICTR-00-56B-A), Appeals Chamber, June 30, 2014, § 133.
67 See: Judgment, Orić (IT-03-68-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 July 2008, § 177; Judgment, Gotovina et 
al. (IT-06-90-T), Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011, § 1965; Judgment Ndindiliyimana et al. (ICTR-
00-56-T), Trial Chamber, 17 May 2011, § 1953 and 2008; Judgment, Bagosora and Sengiyumva 
(ICTR-98-41-A), Appeals Chamber, 14 December  2011, § 683;  Judgment, Ndahimana (ICTR-01-
68), Trial Chamber, 30 December 2011, §§ 761, 763; Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), 
Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, § 1500; Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 
May 2012, §§ 500-501; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 
2013, § 116; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, §§ 254-261.
68 Judgment, Popović et al. (IT-05-88-T), Trial Chamber, 10 June 2010, § 1043; Judgment, Đorđević 
(IT-05-87/1), Trial Chamber, 23 February 2011, § 1887; Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial 
Chamber, 6 September 2011, § 157; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial 
Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 116.
69 Judgment, Popović et al. (IT-05-88-T), Trial Chamber, 10 June 2010, § 1045; Judgment, Đorđević 
(IT-05-87/1), Trial Chamber, 23 February 2011, §§ 1888-1890; Judgment, Gotovina et al. (IT-
06-90-T), Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011, § 1965; Judgment, Perišić (IT-04-81-T), Trial Chamber, 
6 September 2011, §§ 158-160; Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 
February 2012, § 1501; Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, § 502; 
Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 117.
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3.3. Joint Criminal Enterprise
The ICTY jurisprudence has distinguished three types of JCE.70 In the first form of joint 
criminal enterprise, all of the co-perpetrators possess the same intent to effect the com-
mon purpose, namely the crime.71 The second form of joint criminal enterprise, the ‘sys-
temic’ form, a variant of the first form, is characterized by the existence of an organized 
criminal system, in particular in the case of concentration or detention camps. This form 
of joint criminal enterprise requires personal knowledge of the organized system and 
intent to further the criminal purpose of that system. 
The third, ‘extended’ form of joint criminal enterprise entails responsibility for crimes 
committed beyond the common purpose, but which are nevertheless a natural and fore-
seeable consequence of the common purpose. The requisite mens rea for the extended 
form is twofold. First, the accused must have the intention to participate in and contrib-
ute to the common criminal purpose. Second, in order to be held responsible for crimes 
which were not part of the common criminal purpose, but which were nevertheless a 
natural and foreseeable consequence of it, the accused must also know that such a crime 
might be perpetrated by a member of the group, and willingly take the risk that the crime 
might occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.72 
The general requirements for this type of responsibility are as follows: 
•	 a plurality of persons, who do not need to be organized in a military, political or ad-
ministrative structure; 
•	 the existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or involves the 
commission of a crime. There is no necessity for this plan, design or purpose to have 
been previously arranged or formulated. The common plan or purpose may materi-
70 See: Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 227; Judgment, Vasiljević 
(IT-98-32-A), Appeals Chamber, 25 February 2004, § 100; Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24-A), 
Appeals Chamber, 22 March 2006, § 64. It is worth noting that in one of the first cases in which 
JCE was used, namely the Tadić case, the accused had been acquitted by the Trial Chamber 
since it could not be proven that he, as part of a larger group of five men, had played any part in 
the commission of murder. The Appeals Chamber found that there was criminal liability based 
on JCE even if there was no proof of the personal commission of any of the members in the 
JCE; see for more details, Darcy, Collective Responsibility and Accountability Under International 
Law (Transnational Publishers 2007) pp. 227-228. For an subsequent detailed analysis that the 
Tadić case had correctly considered JCE to be part of customary international law, see Judgment, 
Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 27 January 2014, §§ 32-58.
71 Judgment, Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84bis-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 2012, § 620.
72 Judgment, Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84bis-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 2012, § 621; Judgment, 
Tolimir (IT-05-88/2-T), Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, §§ 888 and 897; Judgment, Prlić et al. 
(IT-04-74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, §§ 203-204; Judgment, Stanišić and Simatović (IT-03-
69-T), Trial Chamber, 30 May 2013, § 1255-1257; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals 
Chamber, 27 January 2014, §§ 468 and 474.
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alise extemporaneously and be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts 
in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise; 
•	 participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetration of one 
of the international crimes. This participation need not involve commission of a spe-
cific crime under one of those provisions but may take the form of assistance in, or 
contribution to, the execution of the common plan or purpose; the participation in 
the enterprise must be significant, meaning an act or omission that makes an enter-
prise efficient or effective; e.g. a participation that enables the system to run more 
smoothly or without disruption.73 
More recently, some refinements and clarifications have been made to these general 
principles.74 
73 Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 227; Judgment, Vasiljević (IT-
98-32-A), Appeals Chamber, 25 February 2004, § 100; Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24-A), Appeals 
Chamber, 22 March 2006, § 64; Judgment, Hategekimana (ICTR-00-55B-T), Trial Chamber, 
6 December 2010, § 649-650; Judgment, Gatete (ICTR-2000-61-T), Trial Chamber, 31 March 
2011, §§ 577-579; Judgment, Gotovina et al. (IT-06-90-T), Trial Chamber, 15 April 2011, § 1950-
1954; Judgment, Casimir Bizimungu  et al. ( ICTR-99-50-T), Trial Chamber, 30 September 2011, 
§§ 1906-1909; Judgment, Ndahimana (ICTR-01-68), Trial Chamber, 30 December 2011, § 721; 
Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, §1436; Judgment, 
Nizeyimana (ICTR-2000-55C), Trial Chamber, 19 June 2012, §§ 1454-1456; Judgment, Taylor 
(SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, §§ 457-463; Judgment, Gatete (ICTR-2000-61-A), 
Appeals Chamber, 9 October 2012, §§ 239, 241; Judgment, Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84bis-T), Trial 
Chamber, 29 November 2012, § 618-619; Judgment, Tolimir (IT-05-88/2-T), Trial Chamber, 
12 December 2012, §§ 889-890; Judgment, Ngirabatware (ICTR-99-54-T), Trial Chamber, 20 
December 2012, § 1300; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 
March 2013, §§ 101-103; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, §§ 212-
216;  Judgment, Stanišić and Simatović (IT-03-69-T), Trial Chamber, 30 May 2013, § 1258.
74 This might have been the result of criticism raised in the academic literature where this form of 
liability, especially the extended variety, has been controversial; see for instance: Schabas, Mens 
Rea and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 New England Law Review 
(2003) pp. 1030–1036; Powles, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial 
Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004) pp. 606–
616; Marston Danner & Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 California Law Review 
(2005) pp. 133-137; Fletcher & Ohlin, Relearning Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in 
the Darfur Case, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005) pp. 548-550; Ramer, Joint 
Criminal Enterprise Liability and Persecution,  7 Chicago-Kent Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (2007) pp. 58-61; Darcy, Collective Responsibility and Accountability Under 
International Law (Transnational Publishers 2007) pp. 245-253;Robinson, The Identity Crisis 
of International Criminal Law, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (2008) pp. 938-943; 
Damgaard, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes, Selected Pertinent 
Issues (Springer Verlag 2008) pp. 207-211 and 236-261; Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit 
International Crimes, 11 Chicago Journal of International Law (2010-2011) pp. 693-753; van 
Sliedregt 2012, op.cit., pp. 141-142; van Sliedregt, The Curious Case of International Criminal 
Liability, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) pp. 1171-1188.
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In general, the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise can be used against high level 
functionaries75 and is not restricted to small-scale cases but can also apply to large crim-
inal enterprises.76 Conversely, where the common purpose includes crimes committed 
over a wide geographical area, a person may be found criminally responsible for his par-
ticipation in the enterprise, even if his contributions to the enterprise occurred only in a 
much smaller geographical area.77
With respect to the first two categories, it has been made clear that mere membership 
in the group having a common criminal purpose is not sufficient,78 although an omission 
can amount to JCE participation.79 However, it is not required that each member in the 
JCE is identified by name but it can be sufficient to refer to categories or groups of per-
sons.80
The common criminal objective of the JCE may also evolve over time, as long as the 
members agreed on this expansion of means. It means that the crimes that make up the 
common purpose may evolve and change over time and as such the JCE may have differ-
ent participants at different times.81
It is not necessary that the persons carrying out the actus reus of the crime forming 
part of the common purpose have been participants in or members of the JCE. Conse-
quently, persons carrying out the crime need not share the intent of the crime with the 
participants in the common purpose. Nor is the mental state of persons carrying out the 
crime a determinative factor in finding the requisite intent for the participants in a JCE. 
But if a JCE member used a non-member to commit a crime, that crime must be traced 
75 Judgment, Krajišnik, (IT-00-39-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 March 2009, § 194.
76 Judgment, Brđanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007, § 425. For a commentary of 
the theory of interlinked JCE coming out of this decision, see van Sliedregt 2012, op.cit., pp. 158-
165 and 181-182.
77 Judgment, Tadić (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, § 199; Judgment, Popović et al. 
(IT-05-88-T), Trial Chamber, 10 June 2010, § 1024.
78 Judgment, Brđanin (IT-99-36), Trial Chamber, 1 September 2004, § 263; Judgment, Karemera et 
al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, § 1437.
79 Judgment, Ndahimana (ICTR-01-68), Trial Chamber, 30 December 2011, §§ 810-811; Judgment, 
Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84bis-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 2012, § 619.
80 Judgment, Krajišnik, (IT-00-39-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 March 2009, § 156; Judgment, 
Đorđević (IT-05-87/1), Trial Chamber, 23 February 2011, § 1862; Judgment, Haradinaje et al. 
(IT-04-84bis-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 2012, § 617; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), 
Appeals Chamber, 27 January 2014, §§ 127-130.
81 Judgment, Krajišnik, (IT-00-39-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 March 2009, § 163; Judgment, 
Đorđević (IT-05-87/1), Trial Chamber, 23 February 2011, § 1862; Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, 
Cumulative charging, STL-II-OI/I/AC/RI76bis, Appeals Chamber, 16 February 2011, §§ 
246-248; Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, § 464; Judgment, 
Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84bis-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 2012, § 618; Judgment, Tolimir 
(IT-05-88/2-T), Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, §§ 891-892; Judgment, Šainović et al. (IT-
05-87-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, §§ 609-611.
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back to the member of the JCE.82 For persons in a criminal enterprise to be liable it must 
be shown that they acted together, or in concert with each other, in the implementation 
of a common objective,83 but is not a legal requirement that they acted in unison.84
With respect to the contribution factor, the participation or contribution of an ac-
cused to the common purpose need not be substantive or criminal but it should at least 
be a significant contribution to the crimes committed.85 The fact that different persons 
might have different levels of involvement does not negate the existence of a JCE and a 
different level of involvement can be dealt with at the sentencing stage.86 A person’s pos-
ition of authority and silent approval militate in favour of a finding that his participation 
was significant,87 which includes a failure to ensure the investigation and punishment of 
crimes committed.88
82 Judgment, Krajišnik, (IT-00-39-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 March 2009, § 225-226; Judgment, 
Đorđević (IT-05-87/1), Trial Chamber, 23 February 2011, §§ 1864-1868; Judgment, Karemera et al. 
(ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, § 1438; Judgment, Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-
08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 104; Judgment, Stanišić and Simatović (IT-03-69-T), 
Trial Chamber, 30 May 2013, § 1258; Judgment (Rule 98bis), Karadžić (IT -95-5/18-AR98bis.1), 
Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2013, § 79; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 27 
January 2014, §§ 165, 169 and 171; Judgement, Šainović et al. (IT-05-87-A), Appeals Chamber, 
23 January 2014, §§ 1256-1257.
83 Judgment, Stanišić and Simatović (IT-03-69-T), Trial Chamber, 30 May 2013, § 1259.
84 Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 27 January 2014, §§ 138-142.
85 Judgment, Krajišnik, (IT-00-39-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 March 2009, § 215; Judgement, Šainović 
et al. (IT-05-87-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, §§ 985 and 987.This implies a lesser level 
of contribution for JCE as compared to aiding and abetting according to: Judgment, Gotovina 
and Markač (IT-06-90-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2012, §§ 147 and 149; Judgment, 
Haradinaj et al. (IT-04-84bis-T), Trial Chamber, 29 November 2012, § 619; Judgment, Tolimir 
(IT-05-88/2-T), Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, §§ 893-894; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-
74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, § 221; Judgment, Stanišić and Simatović (IT-03-69-T), Trial 
Chamber, 30 May 2013, § 1258. On this issue, see: Boas, Bischoff & Reid, Forms of Responsibility 
in International Criminal Law (CUP 2007) pp. 422-423; Robinson 2008, op. cit. at note 75, pp. 
925–963 at 939.
86 Judgment, Brđanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007, § 432; Judgment, Đorđević 
(IT-05-87/1), Trial Chamber, 23 February 2011, § 1863.
87 Judgment, Tolimir (IT-05-88/2-T), Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, § 894; Judgement, 
Šainović et al. (IT-05-87-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, §§ 1242 and 1368.
88 Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 27 January 2014, §§ 454 and 460; 
Judgement, Šainović et al. (IT-05-87-A), Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, §§ 1233-1234.
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With respect to the third category of JCE a person 
can only be held responsible for a crime outside the common purpose, if under the 
circumstances of the case: (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated 
by one or othermembers of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk (dolus 
eventualis). The crime must be shown to have been foreseeable to the accused in particu-
lar.89 
Willingly taking a risk means a decision to participate in a JCE with the awareness 
that crime was a possible (not probable) consequence of the implementation of that en-
terprise.90 For third category JCE liability, the accused does not need to possess the requi-
site intent for the crime falling outside the common purpose. This also applies to specific 
intent crimes. The mental state of the person or persons carrying out the extended crime 
is not relevant for the finding of the mental state of the accused, but is determinative to 
the finding of which extended crime was committed.91
A JCE can also be a basis for liability in genocide, including the third category.92 
JCE has been used outside the ICTY/ICTR context in the proceedings of the Sierra 
Leone Special Court93 as well in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia, 
although in the latter institution it was decided that the third category was not part of 
89 Judgment, Brđanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007, § 365; Judgment, Ngirabatware 
(ICTR-99-54-T), Trial Chamber, 20 December 2012, § 1302; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-
87/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 27 January 2014, § 906; Judgement, Šainović et al. (IT-05-87-A), 
Appeals Chamber, 23 January 2014, §§ 1281-1282, 1525, 1538 and 1557.
90 Judgment, Brđanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber, 3 April 2007, § 411; Judgment, Karemera 
et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, §§ 1463-1464; Judgment, Gotovina and 
Markač (IT-06-90-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2012, §§ 90 and 97; Judgment, Stanišić 
and Župljanin (IT-08-91-T), Trial Chamber, 27 March 2013, § 106; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-
74), Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, § 220; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 
27 January 2014, §§ 907, 911-913 and 926-927.
91 Judgment, Popović et al. (IT-05-88-T), Trial Chamber, 10 June 2010, § 1031.
92 Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Brđanin (IT-99-36-A), Appeals Chamber), 19 March 2004, §§ 
5-10. However, see Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: 
Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative charging, STL-II-OI/I/AC/RI76bis, 
Appeals Chamber, 16 February 2011, § 249 with respect to specific intent offences in general; 
as well in this respect see: Judgment, Ndahimana (ICTR-01-68), Trial Chamber, 30 December 
2011, § 722; Judgment, Karemera et al. (ICTR-98-44-T), Trial Chamber, 2 February 2012, § 
1439; Judgment, Taylor (SCSL-03-01-T), Trial Chamber, 18 May 2012, § 468; Judgment, Tolimir 
(IT-05-88/2-T), Trial Chamber, 12 December 2012, § 898; Judgment, Ngirabatware (ICTR-99-
54-T), Trial Chamber, 20 December 2012, § 1301; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals 
Chamber, 27 January 2014, §§ 77-84 (the latter indicating the JCE III can be used for special 
intent crimes).
93 Judgment, Brima, Kamara and Kanu (‘AFRC’) (SCSL-2004-16-A), Appeals Chamber, 22 
February 2008, §§ 72-86 and Judgment, Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (‘RUF’), SCSL-04-14-A), Appeals 
Chamber, 26 October 2009, §§ 295-306 and 312-318.
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customary international law nor was it included in the law of Cambodia during the time 
for which the Chambers had jurisdiction, in the seventies.94 
3.4.  Perpetration95
According to the ICC jurisprudence, there are three forms of committing a crime as a 
perpetrator, namely where a person: 
(a) physically carries out the objective elements of the offence (commission of the crime 
in person, or direct perpetration); 
(b) has, along with others, control over the offence by reason of the essential tasks as-
signed to him or her (commission of the crime jointly with others, or co-perpetration); or 
c) controls the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offence (commis-
sion of the crime through another person, or indirect perpetration).96
In addition, the distinction between principals and accessories in a situation with a 
plurality of persons can also be made along a spectrum, in which different aspects of the 
involvement are emphasized. If the objective manifestation of the crime (in that all the 
94 Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigating Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise 
(JCE), (Case File 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Pre-Trial Chamber, May 20, 2010, §§ 
69-72 re JCE I and II and §§ 77, 83 and 87. For JCE III; see also: Judgement, Kaing Guek Eav 
alias Duch (Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC), Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paragraphs 504-
513; Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise (Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/
ECCC/TC (Trial Chamber, September 12, 2011. For a commentary, see Karnavas, Joint Criminal 
Enterprise at the ECCC: A Critical Analysis of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision Against the 
Application of JCE III and two Divergent Commentaries on the Same, 21 Criminal Law Forum 
(2010), pp. 445-494.
95 For a comparison between JCE and perpetration, see Manacorda & Meloni, Indirect Perpetration 
versus Joint Criminal Enterprise: Concurring Approaches in the Practice of International 
Criminal Law?, 9 Journal of  International Criminal Justice (2011) pp. 159-178.
96 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 
January 2007, §§ 332; Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Katanga and Chui (ICC No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008, § 488 (which also developed the 
notion of indirect co-perpetration in §§ 491-493; Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, 
Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 8 February 2010, §153; Judgment, Chui, 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (ICC-01/04-02/12), Trial Chamber, 
18 December 2012, was of the view that the notion of indirect perpetration, in so far it goes 
beyond perpetration through another person, was an unwarranted extension of article 25(3)(a) 
(§§ 58-64) as was the notion of a person’s control over an organization (§§ 49-57), which was 
repeated in Judgment, Katanga, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ICC-
01/04-01/07, Trial Chamber, March 7, 2014, §§ 277-281 and in Partially Dissenting opinion of 
Judge Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Blé Goudé., (ICC-02/11-02/11-186-Anx), December 11, 
2014, § 5. For a subsequent discussion regarding the notion of perpetration through another 
person, as well as direct perpetration, see Judgment, Katanga (ICC- ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial 
Chamber, March 7, 2014, §§ 1398-1416. For a subsequent discussion of indirect co-perpetration, 
see Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06, June 9, 2014, 
§§104, 121 and 136; see also van Sliedregt 2012, op.cit., at 165-171.
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elements are carried out by the same person) is the focal point of investigation this can be 
called an objective approach with a person liable as a principal. The subjective approach 
does not primarily examine the level of contribution but instead the shared intent to car-
ry out a crime, which is done in the JCE or common purpose doctrine. Co-perpetration 
focuses on the degree of control carried out by a person who is removed from the scene of 
the crime but has control or is the mastermind behind the commission of the offences.97
The actus reus of co-perpetration is twofold: the existence of an agreement or com-
mon plan, 98 which for a time had been possibly replaced by the requirement of shared 
97 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 
January 2007, §§ 327-331; Decision of Confirmation of Charges, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-
Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009, §§ 346-347; Corrigendum of the Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges, Nourain and Jamus, (ICC-02/05-03/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 March 2011, § 126; 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, 
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 
March 2011, § 39. However, see Judgment, Chui, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van 
den Wyngaert (ICC-01/04-02/12), Trial Chamber, 18 December 2012, § 6; Judgment, Katanga 
(ICC- ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial Chamber, March 7, 2014, §§ 1390-1397. For a commentary on 
this jurisprudence see Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law, 
12 Chicago Journal of International Law (2011), pp. 159-200; Weigend, Perpetration Through an 
Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German Legal Concept, 9 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2011), pp. 91-111; Ohlin, Second-Order Linking Principles: Combining Vertical 
and Horizontal Modes of Liability, 25 Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), pp. 771-797; 
Wirth, Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment, 10 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2012) pp. 971-995; Ohlin, van Sliedregt & Weigend, Assessing the Control-Theory, 26 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) pp. 725-746; Ambos, Workshop, a Symposium and 
the Katanga Trial Judgment of 7 March 2014, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) 
pp. 219-229; Weigend, Problems of Attribution in International Criminal Law: A German 
Perspective, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) pp. 253-266; Cryer, Imputation 
and Complicity in Common Law States: A (Partial) View from England and Wales, 12 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2014) pp. 267-281; Ohlin, Searching for the Hinterman: In Praise 
of Subjective Theories of Imputation’, 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014) pp. 325-
343.
98 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
29 January 2007, §§ 343-348; Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Katanga and Chui 
(ICC No. ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008, §§ 519-526; Decision of 
Confirmation of Charges, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009, § 350; 
Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
8 February 2010, §160; Corrigendum of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Nourain 
and Jamus, (ICC-02/05-03/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 March 2011, §§ 128-129, 136; Decision 
on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (CC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 March 
2011, § 36; Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei 
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
8 March 2011, § 40; Judgment, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber, 14 March 2012, §§ 
989-999; Decision of the Confirmation of Charges, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11), June 12, 2014, 
§ 230. Decision of the Confirmation of Charges, Blé Goudé, (ICC-02/11-02/11), December 11, 
2014, § 134. 
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intent99 between two or more persons; and the co-ordinated essential contribution100 by 
each of these persons resulting in the commission of a crime. With respect to the first of 
these requirements, the agreement does not have to be explicit nor does the plan have to 
be specifically directed at committing a crime but only if its implementation embodies a 
sufficient risk that, in the ordinary course of events, a crime will be committed.101 As to 
essential contribution, there is no need to establish presence at the scene of the crime or 
that there was a direct and physical link between the contribution and the commission 
of the crime.102 The essential contribution appeared to have been replaced by a different 
element, namely direct contribution but the original approach was restored by the first 
appeal decision in thie area.103
The mens rea of this type of liability has three aspects, namely the subjective element 
of the co-perpetrators with respect to underlying crime, secondly the fact that the co-per-
petrators are all mutually aware and mutually accept that implementing their common 
plan may result in the realization of the objective elements of the crime and thirdly that 
99 Judgment, Chui, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (ICC-01/04-02/12), 
Trial Chamber, 18 December 2012, §§ 32-35.
100 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
29 January 2007, §§ 343-348; Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Katanga and Chui 
(ICC No. ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008, §§ 519-526; Decision of 
Confirmation of Charges, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009, § 350; 
Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
8 February 2010, §160; Corrigendum of the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Nourain 
and Jamus, (ICC-02/05-03/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 March 2011, §§ 128-129, 136; Decision 
on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (CC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 March 
2011, § 36; Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei 
Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
8 March 2011, § 40; Judgment, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber, 14 March 2012, §§ 
989-999; Decision of the Confirmation of Charges, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11), June 12, 2014, § 
230.
101 Judgment, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber, 14 March 2012, §§ 983-988.
102 Judgment, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber, 14 March 2012, §§ 1004-1005. Judgment 
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06 A5) Appeals Chamber, 1 December 2014, § 469.
103 Judgment, Chui, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (ICC-01/04-02/12), 
Trial Chamber, 18 December 2012, §§ 40-48. Judgment, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06 A5) Appeals 
Chamber, 1 December 2014, § 469. 
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the persons are aware of the factual circumstances enabling them to jointly control the 
crime.104
3.5.  Observations with respect to participation in international crimes
The three types of liability discussed above, all have some peculiarities, apart from (or 
maybe because of) built-in legal obstacles, which have limited their application in a more 
general sense across all the international institutions. 
Command responsibility was a main-stay in the charges in both international and 
national military tribunals after the Second World War but its importance diminished in 
its application by the ICTY, ICTR or ICC. Two factors seem to have contributed to this 
lack of interest in this form of liability at the two tribunals and the international court. 
The first factor is related to the fact that after the Second World War, the notion of com-
mand responsibility was in its infancy and a broad notion of what constitutes knowledge 
was applied, resulting in a doctrine, which was considered too large a circle to be applied 
to such perpetrators.105 Secondly, the evidence available in especially German and Japa-
nese military cases was primarily based on documents, which made it easier to impute 
the various aspects of commander liability, such as control, knowledge and measures to 
prevent or punish.
This situation changed when the ICTY and ICTR entered the picture of international 
justice. The law of command responsibility became the subject of more scrutiny by their 
judges with as a result that the some of the requirements became the subject of a higher 
or least more detailed threshold, especially for non-military cases. Combined with less 
availability of documentary evidence and necessarily more reliance on insider witnesses 
or technological evidence (which became more crucial but harder to obtain, especially 
104 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
29 January 2007, §§ 349-350; Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Katanga and Chui 
(ICC No. ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 September 2008, §§ 527-528, 533-534 and 
538-539; Decision of Confirmation of Charges, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, 15 June 2009, § 351; Decision of the Confirmation of the Charges, Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09), 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 8 February 2010, § 161; Corrigendum of the Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges, Nourain and Jamus, (ICC-02/05-03/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 March 2011, §§ 
150-153; Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (CC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, 8 March 2011, § 36; Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to 
Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (ICC-01/09-
01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 March 2011, § 40; Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (CC-01/09-
02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012, § 296-297;  Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11), 
Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012, §§ 286-292, 306, 313, 333-336, 348; Judgment, Lubanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber, 14 March 2012, § 1012-1013.
105 Ambos 2013, op. cit., pp. 108-109.
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for the knowledge aspect) some cases, which exclusively used this theory of the case, were 
not successful.106 For that reason, the JCE doctrine became more attractive to prosecu-
tors.
While JCE had its origin in the concentration camp cases after the Second World 
War, it came in full bloom especially at the ICTY, followed by the ICTR and then the 
SLSC. Over time some manifestations to its application were adjusted by the judiciary of 
these institutions, most likely as a result of academic criticism and arguments by defence 
counsel; especially JCE III was seen as problematic in this context, which could account 
for the fact that it is not part of the ICC equivalent of JCE, namely common purpose in 
article 25.3(d).107
With respect to perpetration, not only is this form of liability controversial in inter-
national criminal law in general,108 its parameters are uncertain at the moment as a result 
of disagreement between ICC trial judges themselves. It is hoped that the ICC Appeals 
Chamber, which heard the appeal in the Lubanga case on May 19-20, 2014, will at least 
resolve the latter issue.
4.  Conclusion
International criminal law as a pursuit of global justice has changed over the last 20 years. 
Originally, the main actors in this arena were either an international or hybrid tribunals 
but the situation has changed. 
Now that a large number of domestic players have entered the international justice 
arena there is a risk of unbridled and uncontrolled diversity. In itself diversity at the local 
level is not problematic since international law can and should take into account local 
conditions and customs. In addition, given the fact that international law still finds a 
106 See for instance, Judgment, Halilović (IT-01-48-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 October 2007.
107 Van Sliedregt 2012, op. cit., pp. 146-147; Lafontaine, Prosecuting Genocide, Crimes against 
Humanity and War Crimes in Canadian Courts (Carswell, 2012) p. 241; Ambos 2013, op.cit., pp. 
1272-1273; Cryer et. al., op.cit. at note 51, p. 363; see also Judgment, Chui, Concurring Opinion 
of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert (ICC-01/04-02/12), Trial Chamber, 18 December 2012, § 
61, footnote 77.
108 Perpetration was rejected by a majority of judges of Appeals Chamber of the ICTY/ICTR in 
Judgment, Stakić (IT-97-24-A), Appeals Chamber, 22 March 2006, §§ 58-63; Separate Opinion 
of Judge Shahabuddeen in Judgment, Gacumbitsi, (ICTR-2001-64-A), Appeals Chamber, 7 July 
2006, §§ 42-52; Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the 
Appellant for Committing Genocide in Judgment, Gacumbitsi, (ICTR-2001-64-A), Appeals 
Chamber, 7 July 2006, §§ 17-27; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg in Judgment, Simić 
(IT-95-9-A), Appeals Chamber, 28 November 2006, §§ 11-21; Judgment, Prlić et al. (IT-04-74), 
Trial Chamber, 29 May 2013, § 210; Judgment, Đorđević (IT-05-87/1-A), Appeals Chamber, 27 
January 2014, §§ 63-65; see also Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Interlocutory Decision on the 
Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative charging, STL-II-
OI/I/AC/RI76bis, Appeals Chamber, 16 February 2011, § 256
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great deal of its sources in domestic practice109 eventually these state practices will have 
an effect on international law and therefore international institutions, especially in in-
ternational criminal law where little state practice is required to create a new custom.110 
But this strong relationship between individual state practice and international custom 
in international criminal law creates an equally strong responsibility for states, now that 
they are engaging in this area of law, to ensure that they adhere to the basic principles of 
international criminal law as developed by the international institutions while still re-
taining the ability to infuse such principles with local content. This process is beginning 
as some recent jurisprudence in Argentina111 and Canada has shown.112 
On the other hand, there is an equally important responsibility on the part of the in-
ternational institutions to provide consistent legal guidance to national institutions when 
they engage in international criminal prosecutions. This guidance, in so far as it pertains 
to the most relevant form of extended liability, has not been forthcoming as of yet at the 
international level although the possibility exists that some of the divergent practices can 
be reined in.
Finally, the present reality that most cases of both high and low level perpetrators have 
been successfully prosecuted in countries operating on the basis of territorial jurisdiction 
suggests that there could be a better division of labour between the various international 
and domestic institutions.  Such a division of labour would be based on a dual com-
plementarity approach. At the first level states with an ability to carry out meaningful 
prosecutions for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide should be respon-
sible for doing so for crimes committed on their territory or by their nationals. Persons, 
who have fled such countries, should be returned there either by employing the means 
of extradition or immigration remedies such as deportation. If a prosecution in such a 
country is not possible and a perpetrator is present in another country the latter should 
rely on either passive or universal jurisdiction to take action against that perpetrator. At 
the highest level, i.e. when the other two avenues are not possible the ICC (being most 
likely the only institution at the international level after 2017) could step in.
109 This can be both in treaty law where a multi-lateral convention gains more strength if more 
countries ratify such treaties and in customary international law where states are still a very 
important direct source of law.
110 See Van der Wilt, National Law: A Small but Neat Utensil in the Toolbox of International 
Criminal Tribunals,  10 (2) International Criminal Law Review (2010), pp. 209-241.
111 See http://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-13255-Causa-ESMA--la-C-mara-Federal-de-Casaci-n-Penal-
confirm--las-condenas-y-anul--las-absoluciones.html. 
112 See Currie & Rikhof 2013, op.cit., pp. 275-278.
